INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF CANADA'S WESTERN GRAIN STABILIZATION PROGRAM by Cameron, D. Lynne & Spriggs, John
International Effects  of Canada's
Western Grain Stabilization Program
D. Lynne  Cameron and John Spriggs
Canada's Western Grain Stabilization  Program is analyzed to determine the extent to
which it acts  as a buffer between the Canadian grains economy and the international
grains economy. A dynamic  stochastic  simulation model is constructed to examine
how Canada's Western Grain Stabilization  Program modifies the transmission of:  (a)
domestic yield variability to the foreign  grain market and (b) foreign  demand
variability to the domestic grains market.  With respect to (a), the program was found
to aggravate international uncertainty only  very slightly while with respect to (b) it
was found to substantially  reduce domestic uncertainty.
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In recent years, it has become increasingly ap-
parent that domestic agricultural support pro-
grams in a number of countries have contrib-
uted  to  a  crisis  in  the  international  grains
market.  In  fact, at the Uruguay round of the
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  ne-
gotiations,  domestic  farm  programs  were
placed at the top of the agenda.  In addition to
this political  initiative,  and partly to support
it, many trade  economists  have attempted to
assess the international effects of domestic farm
policies. These studies have tended to focus in
two areas.  They are:  (a) the effects  of agricul-
tural  protection  in general  (Organization  for
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development;
Tyers and Anderson 1988b; Parikh et al.; Ron-
ingen and Dixit) and (b) the effects of specific
approaches  to agricultural  policy (Bureau  of
Agricultural Economics;  Roberts  et al.).  This
article falls into the second of these areas.
Within  this area,  the objective  has usually
been  to  show  how  particular  approaches  to
agricultural policy can have harmful effects on
other countries  and to suggest alternative  ap-
proaches which are less harmful. For example,
Roberts  et al.  argue  that the  U.S.  policy  of
competitive  subsidization  has  significantly
harmed  competing  exporters and that  a less
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harmful  alternative  would  be  tradeable  sup-
port entitlements.
In Canada, the Western Grain Stabilization
Program (WGSP) has been widely touted as a
method of agricultural  support which  is rela-
tively  harmless  to  other grain  exporters  but
which does a good job in filtering out the effects
of foreign market instability on domestic grain
producers.  However,  there  has been no  pre-
vious study of the international  effects of this
program. The  purpose of this article is to at-
tempt  to  at  least partially  fill  this  void.  We
examine this policy as a potential influence on
the transmission of market instability between
the domestic and foreign markets. We consider
how this policy affects: (a) the transmission of
domestic (yield) instability to the foreign grain
market and (b) the transmission of foreign (de-
mand) instability to the domestic market.
Conceptual Framework
The WGSP was introduced in Canada in 1976
as  a  way of reducing  the  income  instability
facing prairie  grain producers.  The WGSP  is
distinguished  from  many  other  stabilization
programs in that, instead of trying to stabilize
price, it attempts to stabilize grain producers'
net cash flow. Net cash flow is determined on
a prairie-wide basis as the difference between
the eligible gross grain receipts  and expenses.
If net cash  flow  falls below the  five-year  av-
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Figure 1.  Simple  market model  showing  the
effects  of the Western Grain Stabilization Pro-
gram
erage,  participants  receive  a  payout  from  a
stabilization fund. It is a voluntary program,
financed  partly by contributions  from  partic-
ipants and partly  by the federal  government.
The  participants'  contribution  is  a  specified
percentage  of gross grain receipts (around  2%
per year). It is determined by a formula which
adjusts the contribution depending  on the  fi-
nancial health  of the stabilization  fund.  (For
further details see Spriggs; and Spriggs and Van
Kooten.)
The effects of the WGSP are illustrated with
the  aid  of the  partial  equilibrium  model  of
figure  1. The  commodity  considered  in  this
market model is a composite of the seven prai-
rie grains covered by the WGSP.  In this figure,
we focus  on the  conceptual  relationships  be-
tween  current  quantities  and current  prices.
Note that here (and in the subsequent  empir-
ical  analysis),  price  refers  to  a  production-
weighted  average  across  the  seven  grains.2
These grains are wheat, barley, oats, rye,  flax, canola, and mus-
tard.  They  represent  all cash  crops grown  on the  prairies  except
for specialty  crops.  Beginning in  1988, the WGSP extended cov-
erage to a number of these specialty crops.
2 The  use of a production-weighted  average price is  easily de-
fensible on the supply side of the model. It may be less defensible
Grain producers  are  assumed  to face  an up-
ward-sloping planned  supply curve (S)  and a
downward-sloping  total  demand  curve  (D).
Total demand is the horizontal summation of
domestic demand for consumption and inven-
tories purposes (DD) and export demand (XD).
In this  graphical  model,  in the  absence  of
the WGSP, producers  will  plan to supply  Q0
and export (Qo  - Q1) at an equilibrium price
of Po. The  WGSP  may have two  effects that
can be represented using the comparative stat-
ics of figure  1. The two effects are a rightward
shift in the planned supply curve from S to S1
and a movement up along the planned supply
curve.  The net result of these two effects  is a
change in equilibrium from (Po, Qo) to (P2,  Q3).
The explanation  of these two effects  is as fol-
lows.
A  shift  in  the  planned  supply  curve  may
result if the stabilization program affects pro-
ducer income risk. If producers in general are
risk  averse,  the  existence  of a  risk-reducing
stabilization program  shifts the planned  sup-
ply curve to the right.
If producers  have  first-order  (positive) au-
toregressive expectations of the aggregate  pay-
out, a movement up the planned supply curve
may result. Such expectations imply that a large
payout this year would lead to the expectation
of a large payout next year. And, according to
the rules of the program, an individual produc-
er's  payout depends on the size  of his or her
levy  contributions  (lagged) which in turn de-
pends on his or her grain output. Thus he/she
has an incentive  to increase  output  this year
as a way of increasing  the share  of expected
payout next year. Algebraically,  we can obtain
this  result  from  the  following  simple  profit
maximization  problem.  The  producer  is  as-
sumed to maximize expected profits (r)  in year
t, where:
= P*.Q + PAY* + P-PAY*T-  C,
and where P* is the expected per-unit value of
grain in the year  t,  Q is the planned quantity
of grain output in year  t, PAY*  is the WGSP
payout to the individual  in year t, PAY*+ 1 de-
notes  the expected  WGSP  payout  to  the in-
dividual in year t +  1, P is the discount rate,
and  C represents  grain-related  costs  of pro-
duction in year  t. In this profit maximization
problem, output for year t is planned in year
t  - 1 and  so  producer  expectations  are  also
on  the demand  side where it could be argued that consumption/
use  weights would be more appropriate.
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made in year t - 1. This reflects the biological
lag  in  agricultural  production.  Costs  are  as-
sumed to be known with certainty at the time
planting decisions  are  made.  The  values  ex-
pressed in this maximization problem are de-
nominated in year  t dollars.
According  to the  stabilization  rules  of the
WGSP, the individual's payout (PAY) is equal
to the  aggregate  prairie-wide  payout  (APAY)
multiplied  by the individual's  share  of total
contributions  to the stabilization fund during
the previous three years. From the individual's
perspective, the only way in which his/her share
of total  contributions  can  be  adjusted  is  by
changing output. The individual can do noth-
ing to affect payout in the current year. But if
a large aggregate payout is expected next year,
the individual may attempt to increase his/her
expected  payout  by  increasing  output  in the
current year.  Suppose we then assume:
PA Y*+  = APA Y*,  SHARE,  and
SHARE = m.Q + n,
where APA Y*+  lis the aggregate payout from the
WGSP expected next year, SHARE is the in-
dividual's  share of total contributions and  m
and  n are  parameters.  And  suppose  that the
individual's  expectation  of aggregate  payout
next year (APAY*,)  is first-order  autoregres-
sive.  Then we can rewrite  the expected profit
function as:
r  = P*.Q + PAY*  + I.(r + s-APAY*)
(m.Q + n)  - C
= (P* + ftr + p-.sAPAY*).Q
+ (PAY*  + P.r n) - C,
where  r and s are  parameters.  Maximization
of this function  requires that the individual's
expected marginal  revenue  (P* +  f. r +  .s.
APA Y*) equals marginal cost (6C/6Q). But note
that the individual's expected  marginal reve-
nue  is  a function  of the  current  period's  ex-
pected aggregate payout. With respect to figure
1, this effect is represented by the price differ-
ence (P2 - Po).
In summary, the presence of the WGSP may
result in two supply-enhancing  effects.  In the
model represented in figure 1, these effects also
imply a reduction in the market equilibrium
world price to Pi. And domestic producers can
also expect to receive area P2 a b P1 as a trans-
fer payment from the government.
In the  following we  specify and  estimate a
model  of  the  prairie  grains  economy  using
econometric methods and the historical sam-
ple period  1966 to 1986. Then we simulate the
model to  explore  the international  effects  of
the  WGSP.  Following  Spriggs,  we  use  the
methodology  of  dynamic  stochastic  simula-
tion. This methodology  is particularly  useful
for analyzing the effects of such policies.  Not
only can it address the two comparative static
effects represented  in figure  1, but it can also
analyze the dynamic effects  which  arise from
the use of moving-average  stabilization rules.
These moving-average rules tend to moderate
the effect of market shocks on expectations.  In
the first simulation exercise  we examine how
the WGSP  modifies  the transmission  of do-
mestic production  uncertainty  to the  foreign
market. In the second simulation exercise  we
examine  how the WGSP  modifies  the trans-
mission of foreign demand uncertainty  to the
domestic market.
Model Specification
The simulation model is as follows:
(1)
(2)
HA = ao + aiP* + a2APAY*
+ a 3CCNUM + a, 4D  + aD2,
QP = HA'(YLD  + u),
(3)  QDD =  0t +  1IP + 32INC +  f 3QDD_,,
(4)  QDS = ro + r,(P*  - P),
(5)
(6)
QDX = 60  + 5PP + v,  and
QP + QPNP + QDS_i
= QDD + QDS + QDX.
HA  is  the  area  planted  to  the seven  WGSP
crops in the Canadian prairies (thousand hect-
ares).  P* is  the producers'  expected  per-unit
average  return  from  the  seven  crops  ($  per
tonne).  This  variable  is  estimated  assuming
autoregressive  expectations  as  discussed  be-
low. APA Y* represents producers' expected ag-
gregate  (prairie-wide) payout from the WGSP
($ thousand). This variable is estimated as dis-
cussed below. CCNUM denotes cattle and calf
numbers  in western  Canada  (thousands).  D1
is a dummy variable  for the LIFT (Lower In-
ventories for Tomorrow) program.  It takes on
a value of one in 1970 and zero otherwise. D2
is a dummy variable  for the WGSP program.
It takes on a value of one for the years begin-
ning  1976  when  the WGSP  was  introduced
and  zero  otherwise.  QP is production  of the
seven  grains  (thousand  tonnes).  YLD  repre-
sents yield of the seven grains (tonnes per hect-
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are).  u is the stochastic error term for the first
simulation exercise.  QDD represents domestic
use of the seven grains (thousand tonnes). P is
the  per-unit  average  return  from  the  seven
crops ($ per tonne). INC  is personal disposable
income  in Canada  ($  million).  QDS is year-
ending inventory of the seven grains (thousand
tonnes). P* is producers' expected per-unit av-
erage return from the seven crops ($ per tonne)
in  the  next  year.  This  variable  is  estimated
assuming  autoregressive  expectations.  QDX
denotes  Canadian exports of the seven  grains
(thousand tonnes). v is the stochastic error term
for the  second simulation  exercise.  QPNP is
nonprairie  production  of  the  seven  grains
(thousand tonnes).  QDS_, is the beginning in-
ventory of the seven grains (thousand tonnes).
The exogenous variables are CCNUM, D 1, D2,
YLD, INC, and QPNP.
Equation (1):  Area Response  (HA)
The  dependent  variable  in  equation  (1) rep-
resents  planned output.  The  equation is esti-
mated using OLS regression. The specification
of this  equation  involves  the following  vari-
ables:
(a) P* is obtained  as the fitted values from
a first-order  autoregressive  equation in price.
The second-order  autoregressive variable was
not found  to be  significant at  the 5% signifi-
cance level. Thus:
(7)  P* = 24.12  + .8191PI.
(b) APA Y*  is obtained  from the solution of
a submodel of the WGSP variables determin-
ing APA Y and where actual values in the cur-
rent year are replaced by assumed producers'
expected values.  The submodel is:
(8)  APAY*  =  Max{O, PPAY*},
(9)  PPAY* = PR*.[(  NC  5  NCF_  5  - NCF*,
(10)  NCF*  =ER*.[GGP*  - GGE*.MPR*],
(11)  GGP* = GM*.P*,
(12)  GM* = 3,975  + .8754GM_,,  and
(13)  GGE* = 92.61  +  1.578GGE_,
- .5982GGE_,.
In  this  submodel,  APAY*  is  assumed  to  be
equal to potential  payout (PPAY*)  whenever
this is greater than zero. PPA  Y* is assumed to
be equal to the expected  participation  rate in
the program (PR*) multiplied by the shortfall
of expected  eligible  net cash flow  from  grain
production  below the preceding  five-year av-
5
erage  [(  NCF_)/5 - NCF*]. NCF* is  as-
i=  1
sumed to  be equal  to the difference  between
expected gross grain proceeds (GGP*) and ex-
pected gross grain expenses on marketed grain
(GGE* MPR*) adjusted by the  expected  eli-
gibility ratio (ER*). GGE* represents expected
gross grain expenses. This is multiplied by the
expected  marketing-production  ratio (MPR*)
to reflect the  fact that not all  produced grain
is  marketed  (e.g.,  that  which  is  fed  to live-
stock).  ER* reflects  the  fact  that  some  pro-
ducers  are  ineligible  (such  as  landlords  and
noncitizens),  and  some  grain  receipts  of eli-
gible producers are ineligible (i.e., those in ex-
cess  of the  established  cap).  Expected  gross
grain proceeds (GGP*) is assumed to be equal
to expected grain marketings (GM*) multiplied
by expected price (P*). GM* is obtained as the
fitted values from a first-order  autoregressive
equation in grain marketings.  The second-or-
der  autoregressive  variable  was not found to
be significant at the 5% significance level. GGE*
is obtained as the fitted values from a second-
order  autoregressive  equation  in  gross  grain
expenses.  The third-order autoregressive vari-
able was not found to be significant at the 5%
significance  level.  For the other  variables  in
this submodel  (ER*, PR*, and MPR*), naive
expectations are assumed. These variables are
generated  by the Western  Grain  Stabilization
Administration  (WGSA)  specifically  for  the
WGSP and hence producers do not have a long
history  of the variables  from  which  to form
their expectations.  In addition,  the variables
do  not change much  from  year to year.  The
coefficients  of variation  for  ER*,  PR*,  and
MPR* over the sample period (1976 to 1986)
are .06, .02, and .05, respectively. One implicit
assumption in the use of this submodel is that
producers  treat the expectational  variables  as
independent of one another.  This assumption
may be justified  on  the basis of information
constraints. Data on the lagged values of vari-
ables in this submodel are readily available in
various  issues of Agriculture  Canada's  West-
ern Grain  Stabilization:  Annual Report. How-
ever,  it appears  that  there  have  been no  at-
tempts  to  generate  information  on  the
correlation among these variables.
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(c) CCNUM represents the substitution pos-
sibilities between livestock and grain produc-
tion on the prairies. Thus, for example, during
the mid-1970s  when the relative profitability
of cattle to grain  production  shifted  in favor
of grain,  there  was a substantial  switch from
cattle production into grain production.
(d)  The variable D 1 reflects the depressing
effect  on  area planted to grains  in  1970  as a
result of the  federal  government's  LIFT pro-
gram. This was a single-year program in which
farmers were paid not to produce wheat.
(e) The  variable  D2 reflects  the possibility
that the WGSP will increase grain acreage  by
reducing risk to producers.
In summary,  note  that equation  (1)  allows
for two separate  effects of the WGSP  on area
planted to grains.  First, it allows for the effect
of the expectation  of a payout and, second, it
allows for the effect of the expected reduction
in income risk.
The  estimated  area  response  equation  is
shown below. All coefficients in this equation
have  signs  that are  expected.  All  coefficients
except the  one associated  with D2 are  signif-
icant at the  10%  significance  level. The  vari-
ables related to the WGSP are APA Y* and D2.
The coefficient on APA Y* suggests that an in-
crease in the expectation  of a payout of $100
million in a given year leads to an increase in
grain area of 1.63 million hectares (about 8%).
The coefficient  on D2 suggests that the pres-
ence of the WGSP has led to a permanent in-
crease in grain area of 759,000 hectares (about
4%).  This may be  explained  by the WGSP's
ability to reduce income  risk together with a
presumed  tendency  of agricultural  producers
to be  risk averse.  The coefficients  on APAY*
and D2 do not look  unreasonable  in magni-
tude.  However,  one  should  be careful  not to
overstate  the result for D2. The variable used
to pick up the risk-reducing effect of  the WGSP
is a dummy variable. It is not very significant
and  could  be  picking  up  the effect  of other
factors affecting  planted area  such  as techno-
logical advance. It is suggested that further re-
search is warranted in the specification of this
effect.
Equation (2):  Production Identity (QP)
This imposes the requirement that production
equals  area  multiplied  by  yield.  In  the  first
simulation,  yield is subjected to random  per-
turbations.
Equation (3): Domestic  Demand  (QDD)
The  variables  in  this  equation  are  fairly
straightforward. With respect to the price vari-
able,  it  is endogenous  to the model  (but see
footnote  2). To avoid the effects of correlation
with the error term on the parameter estima-
tion, instrumental variables estimation is used.
The  instrument chosen  for the price variable
is obtained  as the fitted values from the OLS
regression  of price on the predetermined  and
exogenous  variables in the model.
The income variable reflects the notion that,
for normal goods, as income rises in an econ-
omy, so  does the quantity  consumed,  ceteris
paribus. The lagged QDD variable reflects  the
data that users  of grain  only partially  adjust
consumption in a given period to their desired
level as a result of habit persistence  or costs of
adjustment.  The estimated equation is shown
at the top of the next page.
Equation (4):  Inventory Demand (QDS)
The  explanatory  variable  in this equation  is
the difference between the expected price next
Regressor  Coefficient  t-Value  Elasticitya
Constant  24,020  17.05
P*  20.98  4.28  .13
APAY*  .00163  1.86  .03
CCNUM  -.9285  -5.50  -. 39
D1  -4,194  -6.12
D2  758.8  1.50
R2 = .920,  D.W.  =  1.91,  N= 20 (1967/68 to  1986/87)
a Calculated at the observation  means.
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Regressor  Coefficient  t-Value  Elasticitya
Constant  4,270  1.43
P  -20.27  -3.15  -.15
INC  .0939  3.35  .09
QDD  1  .8209  4.23
R2 = .574,  h = 0.26,  N= 20 (1967/68  to 1986/87)
a Calculated at the observation  means.
year and the current  price. It is expected  that
ending stocks of grain would be positively re-
lated  to  this variable.  The  lower  the current
price is relative to the expected price next year,
the greater  the incentive to hold stocks in ex-
pectation  of making a  speculative  gain.  The
expected price variable is the same as that used
in the supply equation except carried forward
one period.  Since this price difference variable
includes the current price which is endogenous
to the model,  instrumental  variables  estima-
tion was again used here. The estimated equa-
tion is shown below.
Equation (5):  Export Demand  (QDX)
We  were  unable  to  successfully  estimate  an
export demand equation for Canadian prairie
grains. The main problem with estimating such
an equation is the large number of exogenous
factors  affecting  export  demand.  Export  de-
mand is affected by changes in supply and de-
mand conditions in the rest of the world and
these  are numerous.  Thus  for this  study, the
export demand equation  is derived under  as-
sumed values for the export demand elasticity
().
This export demand elasticity is for prairie
grains  covered  by the  WGSP.  This includes
wheat,  coarse  grains,  and  oilseeds  (primarily
canola). Assuming that the price transmission
elasticities (of  wheat, coarse grains, and canola
prices with respect to prairie grains price)  are
equal to one, e for prairie grains is a weighted
average  of the export  demand elasticities  for
wheat, coarse grains, and canola.  Thus:
E =  ale(W) + ae(CG) + (1 - a, - a2)E(C),
where a, is the ratio of prairie wheat exports
to prairie grain  exports.  Over  the simulation
period, its value is about .65. a2 is the ratio of
prairie coarse grain exports to prairie grain ex-
ports.  Over the simulation period, its value is
about .25.  E(W) is the export demand elasticity
for prairie wheat, E(CG) is the export demand
elasticity for prairie coarse grains,  and c(C) is
the export demand elasticity for prairie canola.
From a review of literature, there have been
very few  studies which can provide  some in-
formation  on what range of values  would  be
reasonable.  With  regard  to  Canadian  wheat,
Capel and Rigaux provided estimates (with re-
spect  to  major  importers)  at  around  -1.5.
However,  in  more recent  studies,  Tyers  and
Anderson  (1988a)  estimated  the  export  de-
mand elasticity  at -6.6, while Ahmadi-Esfa-
hani provided estimates (with respect to major
importers) at around - 5. The estimate by Tyers
and Anderson refers to adjustments after one
year.
With regard to coarse grains, we were unable
to locate any  specific estimates  of the export
demand  elasticity.  However,  this  is  not  too
surprising  as Canada is a relatively small  ex-
Regressor  Coefficient  t-Value  Elasticity
Constant  17,970  20.28
P+  - P  623.3  6.08  4.06a
R2 = .594,  D.W.  = 1.39,  N= 20 (1967/68  to 1986/87)
a This elasticity,  calculated  at the observation means,  is with respect to current price.
440  December 1991Western Grain Stabilization  Program  441
porter of such grains  accounting for less than
10% of the quantities exported by the United
States.  The  conventional  wisdom  is that the
export demand for coarse grains is very elastic
and indeed  more  elastic  than the export  de-
mand for wheat. Tyers and Anderson (1988b),
while not providing a specific estimate, suggest
that it is greater than  -40.
With regard to canola, the only estimates we
could find of an export demand elasticity  are
-. 3  (short run) and  -. 6  (long run) from  Ag-
riculture Canada  (1980).
For the purposes  of this  study, we  assume
two alternative  values for e for prairie grains
(-2 and -10).  It is hoped that these will span
the range of  values within which readers expect
the true elasticity to lie.
Given  these assumed  export demand  elas-
ticities, equation (5)  is fitted through the mean
historical  price and export values. Export de-
mand  is  subject  to random  perturbations  in
the second simulation.
Equation (6): Supply-Utilization  Identity
This equation imposes the requirement that at
equilibrium the quantity  supplied to the mar-
ket must equal the quantity demanded.
Model Simulation Results
The simulation model consists of equations (1)
to (13).  In this model, current price (P) is en-
dogenous  to equations (1) to (6).  In equation
(7), the solution value for P helps to determine
P* in the following year.  This in turn affects
planned output [equation  (1)] in two ways: di-
rectly  since  P* is  an explanatory  variable in
equation  (1) and  indirectly  since  it helps  to
determine APAY* through equations (8) to (11).
The preceding model is simulated over the his-
torical period,  1976  to 1986. The first year of
the simulation coincides  with the first year of
the WGSP. Each simulation run uses 100 rep-
licates to generate the stochastic  results. This
number  was  found to  be sufficient  to  render
the results  insensitive  to  the  choice  of start
values for the random number generator.
In the simulation analysis, two scenarios are
considered.  They are the WGSP scenario  (i.e.,
what actually occurred) and the "no WGSP"
scenario.  For each scenario,  two  simulations
are  conducted  which  deal  with  the  interna-
tional  effects of the WGSP. The first explores
how the WGSP  modifies  the transmission  of
domestic yield variability to the foreign  mar-
ket. The second explores how the WGSP mod-
ifies the transmission of foreign demand vari-
ability to the domestic market.  The results  of
the  two  simulation experiments  are  summa-
rized in figures 2 to 5. In each of these figures,
there are two pairs of lines. The solid lines refer
to the WGSP scenario while the dashed lines
refer  to the "no  WGSP"  scenario.  Each pair
of lines represents the range of simulation val-
ues one standard deviation from either side of
the mean.
Simulation 1: Domestic Yield Variability
For this  simulation, equation  (2)  of the sim-
ulation model includes the random error term
(u). It is assumed that domestic grain yield is
a normally distributed random variable  with
mean and standard deviation  estimated from
sample yield data for the period 1966 to 1986.
Unbiased estimates of the mean and standard
deviation are 1.77 and .20 tonnes per hectare,
respectively. The results of the simulation are
summarized in figure 2 (for  =  -2)  and figure
3  (for  =  -10).  In this  model, the effects of
domestic yield variability  are assumed  to be
transmitted internationally to grain exports and
grain  price.  The  estimated  impacts  of  the
WGSP  on the transmission  of domestic yield
variability to these variables are summarized
in panels (a) and (b), respectively.
With respect to the volume of grain exports
[figures  2(a)  and  3(a)],  the WGSP  results  in
generally higher mean levels. This may be at-
tributed to the estimated production-enhanc-
ing  nature  of the program.  Over the  11-year
period, the estimated average increase in mean
exports is about  10% under both assumptions
about e. The variability in exports due to do-
mestic yield variability appears to be slightly
exacerbated  by  the  WGSP.  Under  both  as-
sumptions about c, export variability (as mea-
sured by the standard deviation) increases on
average by about 5% as a result of the WGSP.
With respect to grain price  [figures 2(b) and
3(b)], the WGSP results in slightly lower mean
levels.  Under the less  elastic  export demand
assumption, the average reduction is less than
5%.  Under  the more  elastic  export  demand
assumption, this effect is negligible.  The effect
of the WGSP on the variability in grain price
is negligible  under either assumption about E.
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Figure 2.  Effects  of domestic yield variability
(c =  -2)
Simulation 2: International  Instability
For this simulation,  equation  (5)  of the sim-
ulation model includes the random error term
(v). It is assumed to be normally and indepen-
dently distributed with a mean  of zero and  a
standard deviation estimated from the data for
the period  1966 to  1986. The estimated stan-
dard deviation depends on the assumed e. For
export demand elasticities of -2  and - 10, the
estimated standard deviations are 21,700 and
92,500, respectively. The results of the second
simulation exercise  are  summarized in figure
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Figure 3.  Effects of domestic yield variability
(  =  -10)
4 (c = -2)  and figure 5 (E  = -10).  In this model,
the  effects  of foreign  demand variability  are
assumed  to  be  transmitted  to  the  domestic
market through prairie grain production, grain
price,  and producer gross revenue  from grain
production.  The  estimated  impacts  of  the
WGSP on the transmission of foreign demand
variability to these variables  are summarized
in panels (a),  (b), and (c),  respectively.
With respect to prairie grain production [fig-
ures 4(a)  and 5(a)],  the WGSP results in gen-
erally  higher mean  levels.  Under  either e as-
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Figure 4.  Effects  of foreign demand variabil-
ity (E  =  -2)
effect  of the  WGSP  amounts  to around  7%.
The WGSP appears to have a substantial im-
pact  on the  transmission  of foreign  demand
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Figure 5.  Effects  of foreign demand variabil-
ity (  =  -10)
According  to the model,  the foreign-induced
variability  in  prairie  grain  production  is  re-
duced by 42% when e = -2  and by 38% when
e =  -10.  It appears  that the WGSP  is quite
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successful in filtering  out the effects of inter-
national instability  on domestic production.
With respect to grain price [figures  4(b) and
5(b)],  the WGSP results in lower mean levels.
This is associated  with the predicted produc-
tion-enhancing  effect of the program.  When e
= -2,  the average price reduction is 7%, while
when e =  -10,  the average  price reduction  is
negligible. The WGSP appears to have no clear
impact on the transmission of foreign demand
variability to grain price variability.
With respect to producer gross revenue  [fig-
ures 4(c) and 5(c)],  the WGSP results in higher
mean  levels  and  less variability.  When  pro-
ducer revenue is low, the WGSP appears to be
particularly  successful in raising the level and
evening out the fluctuations over time. This is
suggested by a comparison  of the bottom two
lines in each  figure.  These two lines show the
simulated producer revenue,  one standard de-
viation below the mean, under the WGSP and
"no WGSP" scenarios. By contrast, when pro-
ducer revenue  is high, the WGSP  appears  to
be only modestly successful in raising the level
and  evening  out  the  fluctuations  over  time.
Overall,  because  of the WGSP,  average  pro-
ducer revenue  is expected to increase by  13%
when  e = -2  and by 27% when  e =  -10. At
the same time, the variability in producer rev-
enue is expected to decrease by 29% and 23%,
respectively.  In summary,  the WGSP is  suc-
cessful in filtering out the effects of foreign de-
mand instability  on domestic  producer reve-
nue. This is particularly  the case when foreign
demand is depressed.
Limitations of the Analysis
This study examines the international  effects
of a unilateral Canadian policy decision with
respect  to the WGSP.  As such it treats  other
countries' policies as given. Thus, for example,
we  need  to  exercise  some  caution  when  we
conclude  that the WGSP is successful  in sta-
bilizing  domestic  producer  revenue.  If  all
countries were  to multilaterally remove  their
protection  of grain  producers,  prices  them-
selves might fluctuate less and this in turn might
contribute to greater stability of Canadian pro-
ducer revenue.
A  second  limitation  is  the use  of autore-
gressive expectations  in the estimation  of the
model. There may have been some gains to be
had from  the use of Muthian  rational  expec-
tations  with  all  its  implied  parameter  con-
straints.
A third area to flag for possible further  re-
search is the specification  of the supply equa-
tion. This equation is central to the empirical
results and our specification  is only a first ap-
proximation.
Conclusions
In this  article,  a  simple  market  equilibrium
model of the prairie grains economy was con-
structed  to assess  the  international  effects  of
the WGSP.  The specific stabilization rules of
the WGSP  were incorporated  into the  simu-
lation model in such a way that they were per-
mitted to influence grain production decisions
on the prairies. Conceptually,  this article sug-
gests that there  are at  least two  reasons  why
the  WGSP  may  distort  supply  and  so  have
international effects. First, if  producers are risk
averse with respect to income, then a govern-
ment program of  this nature would provide an
incentive to producers to shift resources from
more risky investments into grain production.
Second, the expectation of a payout itself may
encourage  additional  planned production.
Dynamic stochastic simulation is performed
on the model to examine how the WGSP mod-
ifies  the  transmission  of:  (a)  domestic  yield
variability to the foreign grains market and (b)
foreign  demand  variability  to  the  domestic
grains market.  For each of these two simula-
tion exercises, the model is run with and with-
out the WGSP  in place  and  the results  com-
pared. The model is simulated over the period
1976  to 1986  using  100 replicates.
The international effects are assessed in terms
of the mean level and mean variability  of se-
lected variables.  The mean level effects of the
WGSP  are  largely  as  expected.  Under  the
WGSP it is  predicted  that grain  production
and grain exports tend to increase moderately,
price tends to decrease  slightly, and producer
revenue tends to  increase  moderately.  These
results follow from the estimated production-
enhancing effect of the WGSP.
The mean  variability  effects of the WGSP
are: the WGSP appears to only slightly aggra-
vate the transmission  of domestic yield vari-
ability to the foreign market; at the same time,
it appears  to have  a substantial  effect  on  re-
ducing  the  transmission  of  foreign  demand
variability to the domestic market.
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Postscript
In July  1991  the WGSP  was replaced  by the
Guaranteed  Revenue  Insurance  Program
(GRIP). The GRIP program is financed jointly
by the federal government, the provincial gov-
ernments, and participating producers. It is ex-
pected  to be  significantly  more distortionary
than the WGSP since it is a price-based  sup-
port program rather than an aggregate  net in-
come support program  as was the WGSP.
[Received October 1990; final revision
received July 1991.]
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